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UNITED STATES V. RENVILLE: THE UNSETTLING
CONDITION OF THE SETTLED LAW APPLYING THE
ASSIMILATED CRIMES ACT TO INDIANS
Sharon Womack Doty*
There are three federal laws which govern criminal prosecution
of Indians and non-Indians for offenses committed in Indian
Country.' The plain language of these laws seems clear and
unambiguous. Their application, however, is neither.
2
The first of these three laws is the Major Crimes Act (MCA),
which names fourteen serious crimes falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal courts. The MCA applies when the
regardless of whether the victim
alleged perpetrator is an Indian,
3
is an Indian or a non-Indian.
* Third-year law student, University of Oklahoma.
1. "Indian Country" is a term of art defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151:
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the
term "Indian country," as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within
the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United
States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States whether within the
original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or
without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles
to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through
the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988). The Act states:
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another
Indian or other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder,
manslaughter, kidnaping, rape, maiming, a felony under Chapter 109A,
incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous
weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, arson, burglary, robbery,
and a felony under section 661 of this title within the Indian country, shall
be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing
any of tlhe above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States.
(b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a) of this section that is not
defined and punished by Federal law in force within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States shall be defined and punished in accordance with the
laws of the State in which such offense was committed as are in force at
the time of such offense.
Id.
3. Id.
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The second is the General Crimes Act (GCA),4 which was
originally passed in 1790. After several amendments during the
early nineteenth century, the GCA has remained substantially
unchanged since 1854. The GCA applies to crimes committed by
non-Indians in Indian Country and specifically excludes Indians
from its authority.5 It grants exclusive jurisdiction to the federal
courts for all criminal actions committed by non-Indians within
Indian Country.
The third law utilized in this area is the Assimilative Crimes
Act (ACA).6 The ACA punishes, as a federal offense, any act or
omission committed on a federal enclave which would be punishable under state law if committed under state jurisdiction.8 For
example, a visitor to a national park arrested in 1990 for rape
would be prosecuted in federal court. However, the definition of
rape used by the prosecution would be the one found in the law
of the state where the park was located. The elimination of rape
as a crime covered by the Federal Criminal Code means that the
ACA would provide the vehicle for defining the elements of the
crime committed in the national park.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988). The Act states:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the
United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place
within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the

District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against
the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing
any offense in Indian country who has been punished by the local law of
the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdic-

tion over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively.
Id.
5. Id.

6. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1988). The Act states, in pertinent part:
Whoever within or upon any of the places now existing or hereafter reserved

or acquired as provided in section 7 of this title, is guilty of any act or
omission which, although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction

of the State, Territory, Possession, or District in which such place is situated,
by the laws thereof in force at the time of such act or omission, shall be
guilty of a like offense and subject to a like punishment.
Id. § 13(a).

7. One dictionary defimes "enclave" as "a territorial or culturally distinct unit
enclosed within foreign territory." Wsrnm's NRNTH NEw Cou.a-n
DIcTIoNARY 371
(1989). Federal enclaves are national parks, military bases, and other lands which are

publicly held by the federal government but located within the territorial boundaries of a
state.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1988).
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The ACA only applies if no act of Congress makes the offense
punishable under federal law. In other words, if a crime is covered
by any provision of federal criminal law, the federal statute
governs. If there is no federal law establishing criminal sanctions
for the act committed, the ACA gives the federal court access to
the more extensive provisions of state criminal statutes for defining and punishing offenses. Thus, the ACA is a gap-filler intended
to supplement the Federal Criminal Code as it applies to federal
enclaves. The ACA assimilates state law into situations where
there is no applicable federal statute. 9
This note will review how the Eighth Circuit has applied these
three laws in criminal cases involving Indian perpetrators. In
order to consider the problems presented by the case law in the
Eighth Circuit, the note will first review the evolution of the
MCA, the GCA and the ACA through the case law. Then, the
note will consider the intent of Congress as to the applicability
of the ACA to Indians. Finally, the note will examine how current
case law regarding this use of the ACA in Indian cases conflicts
with long-standing Supreme Court doctrines of tribal sovereignty.
This will lead to what the author suggests is the troubling state
of the law regarding criminal prosecution of Indians in Indian
Country, particularly as Indian criminal law has developed in the
Eighth Circuit.
The Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit apparently regards the application of state
law to criminal offenses committed by Indians in Indian Country
as settled."° However, that description would only be accurate if
one envisions the law "settled" in the midst of a maze, having
been dropped from above with no discernable way in or out.
The scope of the unsettled nature of this "settled" law is most
apparent in United States v. Renville."
In Renville, the Eighth Circuit allowed an unusual application
of state law under the ACA. The court affirmed the conviction
of an Indian, Renville, for the crime of incest. 12 Because incest
is a named offense covered by the MCA, 3 the conviction, at first
9. Id.
10. United States v. Butler, 541 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1976); see also United States v.
Jones, 224 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1965). The Eighth Circuit has not articulated reasons for
applying the ACA in cases where Indians are accused of criminal activities in Indian
Country; the court simply does it.
II. 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985).
12. Id.

13. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988).
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blush, does not appear unusual. The problem arises in the court's
affirmation of the 14use of a South Dakota rape statute to convict
Renville of incest.
The application of the rape statute instead of the incest law
had two obvious effects. The first was the penalty imposed. Rape,
under South Dakota law, carried a penalty three times that of
incest; therefore, the sentence imposed was thirty years rather
than ten years.' The second and far more significant effect was
the unique expansion of the ACA to reach the conviction and
thirty-year sentence. This broadening of the ACA was accomplished without even once addressing how the ACA became part
of the analysis.
Renville's conviction was not wrong. He committed the crime
of incest against his stepdaughter. Perhaps it does not seem harsh
that he is serving thirty years in jail for that crime. The issue,
however, is not whether Renville deserved to be punished. The
issue is, rather, how the court reformed the ACA in order to
achieve the outcome it wanted.
The importance of Renville's use of the ACA is most apparent
when viewed in light of the history of criminal prosecution of
Indians and non-Indians for crimes committed in Indian Country.
Three issues are central to an understanding of the difficulties in
Renville: tribal sovereignty in criminal cases, federal reservation
of jurisdiction over specified crimes and defendants, and Congress's intent as to the applicable statutes. Forging a trail through
the statutes which govern federal criminal prosecution of offenses
committed in Indian Country by both Indians and non-Indians
will help clarify the potential damage of the Renville opinion.
The Evolution of the Statutes
]In 1885, Congress enacted the MCA in response to the decision
of the Supreme Court in Ex parte Crow Dog.'6 In Crow Dog,
the Supreme Court held that Indian tribes were sovereign nations
and that treaties between sovereigns 7 did not automatically subject individual Indians to federal criminal jurisdiction. 8 Crow
Dog was convicted of murder in federal district court in the
Territory of Dakota. He petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ
of habeas corpus alleging that his imprisonment was illegal be14. Renville, 779 F.2d at 434-35.
15. Id. at 432.
16. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).

17. "Sovereigns" here refers to the tribe and the United States.
18. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 568-69.
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cause he was an Indian. Crow Dog's victim was an Indian of
the same tribe and the offense occurred in Indian Country. The
Court, granting the writ, held that neither the Brule Sioux 19 treaty
provisions nor any act of Congress reserved jurisdiction over
criminal prosecution of Indian perpetrators to the United States.
Therefore, jurisdiction over these crimes remained with the Tribe.2
Crow Dog is based on the jurisdictional assumption of tribal
sovereignty which prevails in Indian law. 21 The basic premise of
tribal sovereignty is that a tribe brings full powers of a government
to treaty negotiations with the United States. Only those specific
powers enumerated in the treaty are relinquished by the tribe in
the negotiations. The only other way a tribe's sovereign power
can be diminished is by an act of Congress which subsumes the
tribal power under the federal government's jurisdiction.2
In Crow Dog, the treaty signed by the Brule Sioux Tribe had
not specifically given criminal jurisdiction over Indians to the
United States and Congress had not affinatively taken it away
from the Tribe. Therefore, that power had not changed hands
with the signing of any treaty then in existence.23 Jurisdiction was
retained by the Tribe and Crow Dog's conviction was overturned. 4
Since the Crow Dog decision in 1885, amendments to the MCA
have addressed the problem of how to define punishment for
crimes which are not covered by federal criminal statutes. The
1976 and 1984 amendments specify that incest, burglary, and
involuntary sodomy should be defined by the law of the state in
which the Indian Country is located?
These amendments, which are still a part of the MCA today,
addressed the problem most often facing prosecutors who were
confined to the limited scope of federal criminal statutes. Defining
incest, burglary, and involuntary sodomy by the state law where
the Indian Country was located provided federal courts with the
structure necessary to prosecute Indians for these offenses.
An additional problem arose after the enactment of the MCA.
Because tribes are separate sovereigns from the United States, the
19. Brule Sioux was the tribal affiliation of both Crow Dog and the victim.
20. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 568-69.
21. See e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); 3 Affiliated Tribes -v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877 (1986).
22. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 570-72.
23. Id. at 567-68, 570.
24. Id. at 568-69, 572.
25. Pub. L. No. 94-297, § 2, 90 Stat. 585 (1976) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a)
(1976)) (adding kidnapping to list); Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit 2, § 1009, 98 Stat. 2141
(codified at 18 U.S.C. 1153(a) (1988)) (adding maiming, involuntary sodomy, felony theft,
and burglary, and deleting larceny).
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Supreme Court determined, in Talton v. Mayes,26 that concurrent
jurisdiction existsY Tribal court powers were not created by and
do not spring from the United States Constitution; therefore,

tribal courts were not subject to constitutional constraints which
normally applied in state and federal law.2 According to the
Tal(ton Court, the protections of the Bill of Rights, the U.S.
constitutional provisions against self-incrimination, and the right
to a jury trial did not extend to Indians in tribal courts. 29
The issue of concurrent jurisdiction between federal and tribal
courts, although never specifically resolved in case law, was rendered moot by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA)3 0
Though the ICRA was enacted primarily to guarantee some civil
rights to Indians in tribal court, it also restricted the scope of
potential punishment which could be imposed by the tribe.3
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

163 U.S. 376 (1896).
Id. at 380.
Id. at 382-83.
Id. at 381-82.
25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988). Section 1302 states:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue
warrants, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to
be seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself;
(5) take any private property for a public use without just compensation;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and
public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to
be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense;
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual
punishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any
penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of one year
and [sic] a fine of $5000, or both;
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its
laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of
law;
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment
the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.
Id. § 1302.
31. Id.
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Under the ICRA, as amended, tribal courts may only impose
punishment of not more than one year's incarceration and/or a
maximum $5000 fine.3 2 The tribe may punish any offense com33
mitted by an Indian but only within the limits set by the ICRA.
Therefore, while concurrent jurisdiction exists, the ICRA protects
Indian defendants from imposition of unreasonable penalties.
Passage of the ICRA diffused any problems arising from the
concerns surrounding alleged deprivation of basic civil rights in
tribal courts. The question of whether an Indian was subject to
double jeopardy, 34 though not the subject of the ICRA, was
answered by a review of the definitions and application of the
concept of double jeopardy. Once again, tribal sovereignty was
the determining factor. Defendants could be tried for the same
offense in Federal District Court and in tribal court. Tribal courts
were not bound by a defendant's prosecution in federal court
and neither were federal courts bound by action taken by the
tribe.35
The questions surrounding civil rights and double jeopardy
were not the only concerns which surfaced after passage of the
MCA. Another major problem with the MCA was the issue of
interracial law enforcement. Many treaties contained provisions
dealing with interracial law enforcement.16 Tribes were denied
jurisdiction over non-Indians who committed criminal offenses in
Indian Country.3 7 This left tribes vulnerable to attack and made
non-Indian perpetrators virtually untouchable in Indian Country.
The GCA was passed by Congress in response to these law
enforcement issues. Although the GCA did not do away with all
of the problems tribes had in policing their land, it is still the
current law governing criminal prosecution of non-Indians on
Indian land.
The GCA, while addressing problems of some offenses committed by non-Indians in Indian Country, presented a new di32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Double jeopardy protects defendants from repeated prosecution by a sovereign
for the same offense. See 22 C.J.S. CriminalLaw § 213 (1989).
35. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 380-81 (1896).
36. See F. CoHEN, HANDBOOK OF INDiAN LAW 287-88 (1942 ed.).
37. While historically the federal government had always treated indian that tribes as
lacking jurisdiction over non-Indians, it was not until Oliphant v. Suquamish, 435 U.S.
191 (1978) that the Supreme Court stated that premise as the correct interpretation of
federal law. In his opinion, Justice Rehnquist said it was never the intention of the federal
government to grant jurisdiction to tribes in cases involving non-Indian perpetrators
regardless of the nature of the crime committed by the non-Indian in Indian Country.
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lenmna for prosecutors which Congress addressed in the ACA.
Federal criminal statutes are not as comprehensive and detailed
as state criminal law. Application of state law in federal court to
crimes committed on federal land was an efficient way for Congress to address the problem. Because Indian tribes could not
assert criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in tribal courts and
because many criminal offenses are not contained in the Federal
Criminal Code without application of state law through the ACA,
there would be situations where there would be no charge to
bring against criminal offenders. Therefore, some criminal acts
would be left unprosecuted.
As with the MCA and the GCA, applying the ACA also created
problems. The scope of the ACA was first addressed in Williams
38
v. United States.
The ACA in Case Law
Williams, the seminal case involving application of the ACA,
was decided by the Supreme Court in 1946. Williams was convicted of having sexual intercourse with an unmarried Indian girl
within the boundaries of the Colorado River Indian Reservation.39
There was no evidence that the girl in Williams, who was under
eighteen but over sixteen years of age, was a non-consenting
participant.4 The Court held that the ACA did not allow application of Arizona law to the defendant because the crime for
which he was convicted was made punishable by an act of
Congress. 41 The fact that the definition of the act under federal
law was narrower than the state definition did not mean that
state law could be used to expand the scope of federal law. 42
The Williams court did not mention the MCA because Williams
was a white male and the MCA only applies to Indian defendants. 43 Because the crime was committed by a non-Indian against
an Indian victim in Indian Country, the United States had exclusive jurisdiction under the GCA" and, therefore, the ACA could
trigger application of state law. 45 However, the Court noted that
the legislative history of the ACA did not include any indication
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

327 U.S. 711 (1946).
Id. at 713.
Id.
Id. at 717.
Id.
1818 U.S.C. §§ 548-549 (1946) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988)).
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 217, 218 (1946) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988)).
Williams, 327 U.S. at 713.
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that Congress, after defining a penal offense, would allow the
scope of the offense to be expanded by application of the state
definition. 46 Congress intended to use the ACA to fill in where
no congressional action had taken place. 47 The ACA did not have
the power to modify or repeal existing federal law by applying
state law to a case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States.48
Several sections in the federal criminal code were applicable to
the Williams facts. The offenses of rape, assault with intent to
commit rape, having carnal knowledge of a girl, adultery, and
fornication were all made punishable under the federal code.49
However, Williams's conviction could not be sustained under the
federal rape statute because all the required elements of proof
were not present."0 There was no proof of the use of force and
the evidence indicated that the victim was a willing partner.
Conviction for rape required proof of force on a non-consenting
victim. Since there was also no proof that the girl was under
sixteen at the time of the offense, Williams could not be convicted
of having carnal knowledge of a girl.51
The offense with which Williams was charged came within the
Arizona statutory definition of rape.5 2 The section of the Arizona
Code dealing with rape expanded the definition to include "statutory rape," which was defined as sexual intercourse with a girl
under the age of eighteen, rather than as sexual intercourse with
a girl under 53the age of sixteen, which is how the federal law
defined rape.
Under the federal criminal code, the statutory punishment for
rape was imprisonment for not more than fifteen years for a first
offense and not more than thirty years for a subsequent offense. 54
There was no minimum sentence. The Arizona Code punished
rape by imprisonment for life or any term not less than five
years. 5 Thus, application of the Arizona statute dramatically
changed the range of potential punishment and imposed a minimum sentence.
46. Id. at 717-18.

47. Id.
48. Id.

49. See 18 U.S.C. § 457 (1946) (rape); id. § 458 (carnal knowledge of female under
16 years of age); id. § 516 (adultery); id. § 518 (fornication).
50. Williams, 327 U.S. at 715.

51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 715-16.
See Apiz. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 43-4901 (1939).
Id.
See 18 U.S.C. § 458 (1946) (rape).

55. Atiz. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 43-4901 (1939).
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The Court reversed Williams' conviction and held that the
crime could not be redefined and expanded by application of the
ACA if it was already defined by federal criminal law.16 The acts
covered by the crime of "statutory rape" in Arizona were completely within the federal definition of either adultery or fornication. 57 The state created a different crime by changing the age
of consent of the female to eighteen rather than sixteen. 8
The Williams Court held that the attempt to interpret the ACA
to apply to the particular actions of a party was inconsistent with
congressional intent to prohibit acts of a general type and kind. 9
Congress covered both the generic offense, with the definition of
carnal knowledge,60 and the specific act, with the definition of
adultery. 6' Further investigation of legislative history by the Court
revealed that Congress' purpose was to cover rape and all related
offenses in federal penal legislation. 62 Congress specified the age
of consent as sixteen. 63 If Congress had intended that state law
apply to define rape related offenses or to establish the age of
consent, it would have left one of these two elements for definition by state law through the ACA. It did not; therefore, state
law does not apply.64
The primary consideration by the Williams Court was whether
the generic type of act was covered by congressional enactment.
The Court refused to allow use of the ACA merely to broaden
a federal definition. Since Williams, however, a number of cases
have attempted to invoke the ACA for that very purpose. Courts
have focused on specific kinds of offenses governed by federal
statute. In some cases, the ACA has been applied and in others
its use was denied.
In United States v. Jones,65 a case decided in 1965, the court
held that a charge of disorderly conduct could be brought under
the ACA. 6 In Jones, the defendants were arrested and charged
with disorderly conduct because they blocked the doorways and
entrances to the federal courthouse by chaining doors closed and
56. Williams, 327 U.S. at 724-25.
57. Id. at 718-23.
58. Id. at 718.

59. Id. at 724-25.
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 458 (1946).
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 516 (1946).
62. Williams, 327 U.S. at 724.

63. See 18 U.S.C. § 458 (1946).
64. Williams, 327 U.S. at 725.
65. 244 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
66. Id. at 183.
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chaining themselves to some entrances. These actions prevented
everyone from entering or exiting the building.
The defendants claimed that the offense with which they were
charged was indictable under the federal statute prohibiting picketing and parades.67 The defendants relied on Williams in claiming
that the charge of disorderly conduct was not cognizable under
the ACA. They argued that the existence of a federal offense,
which made their actions indictable, precluded use of the state
law of disorderly conduct. 6 The court held that Williams was
distinguishable because it dealt with assimilation of state law to
expand the scope of existing federal law. In Jones, the defendants
were charged under a legal theory of disorderly conduct, which
was a completely different theory than that underlying the law
regarding picketing and parading.6 9
The court viewed disorderly conduct and picketing and parading
as separate and distinct offenses .7 In contrast, Williams concerned
one offense which was defined narrowly in one law and broadly
in another. 71 Therefore, the general intent of Congress to punish
generic types of crimes, which was the basis of the Williams
decision, was not evident in Jones.
The deciding factor in determining whether the ACA applies
in other cases since Williams has focused on analysis of the
generic nature of conduct. Courts have attempted to discern the
generic nature of the actions prohibited by Congress and relate
that to the specific acts of the defendant. For example, in Butler
v. United States,72 the Eighth Circuit vacated the conviction of
Dean Butler for possession of a firearm.7 3 The court's decision
was based on an assessment of the general intent of congress in
federal firearm statutes.
Butler was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon.
The act occurred in Indian Country. Butler was initially indicted
for violation of the National Firearms Act (NFA).74 He was also
charged with illegal possession of 7a5 firearm through the ACA by
application of South Dakota law.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.

70. Id.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See Williams, 327 U.S. at 717-18.
541 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 737.
18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1201-1203 (1976). Butler was originally charged with receipt

and possession of a firearm under § 1202(a)(1). See Butler, 541 F.2d at 731.
75. Butler, 541 F.2d at 731.
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The Butler court held that the application of state law was
inconsistent with both the plain meaning of the ACA and the
legislative intent and purpose of the ACA. 76 Because the government had previously dropped the NFA charge for unrelated
reasons,7 the court vacated the conviction. 78
The court held that, as in Williams, the key determination was
whether the generic conduct had been made punishable by any
act of Congress.7 9 The court held that the NFA intended to
proscribe the generic conduct of acquisition and possession of
firearms by felons. 0
According to the Butler court, the additional requirements of
proof of interstate commerce and venue under the federal charge
did not determine which law was applicable.8 ' The test for applicability of the ACA did not turn on whether the same elements
of proof were necessary for each crime. Rather, the test was
whether the offense was made punishable by any enactment of
Congress.8 The use of state law to broaden the NFA was rejected
by the court and Butler walked away a free man.83
Butler is also notable because Dean Butler was an Indian. Even
though the court's analysis of the purpose of the ACA is excellent,4 the validity of the ACA's application to an offense committed by an Indian defendant is ignored. In Butler, the Eighth
Circuit makes the statement that "any felon, whether White,
Black or Indian, could be prosecuted under the ACA for possession of a firearm." 85 The court provides no explanation of this
statement and no further explanation of the presumption it implies; that Indian defendants may come within the ACA.
The assumption that Indian defendants come within the scope
of the ACA had no adverse effect on Dean Butler. His conviction
was overturned. The importance of the case centers on its clear
articulation of the test for determining the applicability of the

76. Id. at 733.
77. The Butler opinion indicates the government voluntarily dismissed the charge of

receipt and possession of a firearm before the case came to trial. No reason is stated in
the opinion for dropping the charge. See Butler, 541 F.2d at 731.
78. Butler, 541 F.2d at 737.
79. Id. at 735.
80. Id. at 736.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 737.
83. Id.
84. See id.at 733-34.
85. Id. at 732.
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ACA. 86 This focus on the assessment of whether the ACA is
controlling does not, however, decrease the subtle impact of the
assumptions in this 1976 case on future cases involving Indian
perpetrators and the ACA. The presumption in Butler is that,
were conditions different, an Indian defendant would naturally
be subject to prosecution for offenses through use of the ACA.
This presumption created a powerful precedent for future cases,
even though Butler himself was unaffected by the presumption.
In the same year that Butler was decided by the Eighth Circuit,
the Seventh Circuit rendered an opinion regarding the ACA in
the case of United States v. ChausseeY Chaussee was an inmate
at the United States Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois. He was
convicted of stabbing another inmate. The court held that the
defendant was entitled to be sentenced under federal, rather than
state law. 8
Chaussee was convicted of aggravated battery under an Illinois
statute which provided for imprisonment for one to ten years. 89
The federal statute prohibiting assault with a dangerous weapon
with intent to do bodily harm carried only a five-year maximum
sentence.9 The court held that Congress intended the term "assault," in federal statutes, to include the acts described in the
Illinois "aggravated battery" statute; therefore, the federal statuted governed. 9' State law could be applied through the ACA
only after a search revealed no federal statute which could be
construed as applicable to the circumstances presented. Once
again, the controlling consideration rested on the generic acts
prohibited by Congress as opposed to a careful scrutiny of the
precise acts and analysis of specific characteristics of the particular
offense.
In 1980, the Fourth Circuit also held that a defendant's convictions under state law were preempted by federal statute. In
United States v. Eades,92 the defendant was charged in a ninecount indictment with a variety of crimes which occurred on the
campus of the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis, Mar86. According to the Butler court, state law may not be assimilated under the ACA
where "any enactment of Congress" punishes the conduct. If any Congressional act covers
the actions of the defendant, the ACA is not implicated and state law cannot be triggered.
Id. at 731.
87. 536 F.2d 637 (7th Cir. 1976).

88. Id.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 639.
Id. at 643.
Id. at 644.
615 F.2d 617 (4th Cir. 1980).
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yland. The court upheld Eades' challenge to the use of state law
under the ACA because the Maryland third-degree sexual assault
statute was merely a particular form of assault and battery. 9
In making the determination that state law did not apply in
Eades, the court looked at all of the provisions of the federal
assault statutes rather than just that section dealing with rape or
sexual assault. As a result, the court noted the fact that the
Maryland statute could not be violated without also violating
some provision of federal law.4 The court treated sexual assault
as a generic offense of assault. 95 The Eades court did not require
that the federal statute contain all of the characteristics of the
particular criminal offense. A federal statute covering the generic
type of offense governed. 6
Irt addition to the cases discussed above, other cases assessing
the application of the ACA demonstrate the Eighth Circuit's
diligence in pursuing all possible avenues in the federal statutes
before applying state law through the ACA. 97 Against the backdrop of consistent refusal to use the ACA to unnecessarily broaden
the scope of federal criminal law, the Eighth Circuit decided
United States v. Renville.98
United States v. Renville
Renville, an Indian, was accused of two counts of sexually
abusing his eleven-year-old stepdaughter. 9 His crime was "incest"
under the MCA, which defines "incest" by the statutes in the
state where the crime is committed10° Renville was actually convicted under the MCA and, through the ACA, under South
Dakota's rape law.101 On appeal, Renville stipulated that the state
definition of "incest" applied to Indian cases in federal court. 1°2
He challenged the applicability of state "rape" statutes when the
MCA specifically defined "incest" as an offense and contended
93. Id. at 621.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 622.
96. Id.

97. See also United States v. Provost, 875 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Howard, 654 F.2d 522 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Taylor, 562 F.2d 572 (8th Cir.

1977); State v. Marek, 112 Idaho 860, 736 P.2d 1314 (Idaho 1987).
98.
99.
103.
101.

779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 431.
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (Supp. II 1984).
S.D. CoDn=a LAws ANN. § 22-22-1 (1979 & Supp. 1983). See Renville, 779 F.2d

at 431.
1012. Renville, 779 F.2d at 432.
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that he should have been charged under South Dakota incest
law."'3 The Eighth Circuit upheld the conviction and affirmed the
use of the South Dakota rape statute.' °4
Under South Dakota law, the definition of incest specifically
excluded "sexual penetration."'' 5 The acts Renville committed
included penetration.' ° Renvifle's primary objective in challenging
the use of the rape statute instead of the incest law was clear.
The maximum punishment for incest under South Dakota law
was five years."'° The maximum penalty for rape was fifteen
years.' 8 Renville was sentenced to two consecutive fifteen-year
terms.' 9
The Renville decision contained no discussion as to whether
the ACA was applicable when the defendant was an Indian.
However, the arguments Renville presented provided the court
with an opportunity to address, in detail, its historical interpretation of the ACA as it related to crimes in Indian Country." °
The court did not address the question of whether the ACA was
applicable when the defendant was an Indian; it only confirmed
that the Eighth Circuit had consistently allowed the ACA to be
used against Indian defendants for offenses committed in Indian
Country.
Renville did not challenge the use of the ACA on the basis
that it did not apply to Indian perpetrators. Rather, he argued
that the ACA was inapplicable because his conduct was punishable under the MCA."'
Renville challenged his conviction by attempting to focus the
court's attention on the plain language of the MCA.1 2 Renville
103. See S.D. CODmD LAws ANN. § 22-22-19 (Supp. 1983).
104. Renville, 779 F.2d at 435.
105. See S.D. CODIID LAws ANN. § 22-22-19 (Supp. 1983). The South Dakota
criminal code does not define the term "sexual intercourse." It appears consistent with
the common law definition of the term which both parties in Renville admitted does not
cover Renville's acts. In State v. Brammer, the South Dakota Supreme Court construed
the terms "rape" and "sexual contact" as mutually exclusive. State v. Bramnmer, 304
N.W.2d 111, 113-14 (S.D. 1981). In Brammer, the defendant was charged under both
provisions of state law. The court held that "sexual contact" was a separate offense
intended to cover acts of persons who sexually molest young children without raping them.
Id. at 114.
106. Renville, 779 F.2d at 432.
107. See S.D. CODImD LAws ANN. § 22-22-19.1 (Supp. 1983). Under South Dakota
law, a class five felony was punishable by a maximum of five years.
108. Rape was either a class 2 or class 3 felony as prescribed by S.D. CODwmD LAws
ANN. § 22-22-1 (1984). Therefore, the maximum penalty for the crime of rape when the
victim was eleven years of age, as in Renville, was 15 years (class 3 felony maximum).
109. Renville, 779 F.2d at 432.
110. Id. at 432-35.
111. Id. at 434.
112. Id. at 435.
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argued that he could only be subject to South Dakota's incest
law.113 No one questioned the appropriateness of this interpretation of the ACA. The defendant, the prosecutor and the court
all presumed that the ACA was applicable to the case because
Renville was charged under the MCA with incest, which meant
that the state incest law applied. Everyone involved assumed that
the application of state law as the definition of incest in the
MCA justified the intervention of the ACA.
Renville was charged with rape under South Dakota law because, according to the court, the definition in that statute more
accurately described the acts he committed." 4 There seems to be
an important step missing in the court's analysis. How did a law,
which Congress clearly intended as a vehicle for strengthening
federal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes in Indian
Cottry, magically become applicable to Indians? There is no
clear answer. In fact, it was not until the 1987 case of Pueblo
of Santa Ana v. Hodel"5 that a district court considered the
possibility that the ACA does not apply to Indians.
Pueblo involved a civil regulatory issue." 6 While the ACA refers
only to criminal offenses, the Secretary of the Interior cited the
ACA as his reason for denial of the tribe's request for approval
of a lease agreement for construction of a dog racing facility in
Indian Country." 7 The Secretary based his decision on the premise
that because a dog racing facility would violate New Mexico
regulatory provisions, it was illegal under the ACA."8
The Pueblo court reviewed the history of the application of
the ACA in Indian Country in contrast to longstanding doctrines
of tribal insulation from state action." 9 The court concluded that
application of the ACA in Indian Country was "patently incompatible" with the intents and purposes of Congress when the
ACA was enacted.120 In addition, the court noted that the Supreme Court's early establishment of the doctrine that Indian
tribal sovereigns are "distinct, independent political communities"
2
had not changed through the years.'1
113. Id. at 432.
114. Id. at 435.
115. 663 F. Supp. 1300 (D.D.C. 1987).
116. Id.
117. Id.at 1301.
118. Id. at 1303.
119. Id.at 1310.
12D. Id.
121. Id.
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The Pueblo court pointed out that contrary to this prevailing
doctrine, case law had applied the ACA to offenses in Indian
Country.'2 Because neither the Supreme Court nor Congress had
acted in the interim to change this assumption, the precedents
were still good law. Although the court felt "bound" to apply
the ACA in the Pueblo case, it did not see fit to expand the
definition of the ACA's applicability to include civil cases. 11
In the process of deciding to apply the ACA in Pueblo, the
court made some interesting decisions regarding the use of precedent. 12A It applied the ACA on the basis of precedents available
in three of the circuits, as well as the silence of Congress on the
issue. While the court noted the serious inconsistency between
applying the ACA to Indian perpetrators and the long-standing
Supreme Court doctrine placing Indians outside the jurisdiction
of the states, it chose to follow the precedents in the circuitsan interesting choice which it based solely on the fact that the
Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the issue and Congress
has not acted.'2 Given the vast numbers of petitioners for certiorari each year, and the consistent inaction of Congress on any
issue not waving a red flag in its face, the court's decision seems
somewhat illogical.
The only way the ACA could apply to Indian perpetrators is
if Congress so stipulated by legislative action. It has not done
so. Inaction by Congress is not and never has been a justification
for assuming expansion of the United States government's authority in Indian matters.
The tribe has jurisdiction over all crimes not reserved to the
jurisdiction of the United States by the MCA. Only those provisions of the federal criminal code which are named in the MCA
apply to Indians. 126 There is no gap to fill because tribal law is
already there. Tribal law covers the offenses specified in the MCA
as well as unnamed offenses for which an Indian is subject only
to tribal law. There is no opening through which the ACA can
intervene. The ACA was intended to help fill in the missing
provisions of federal criminal law so that non-Indians could not
run rampant in Indian Country with no fear of arrest.
Tribes had law which covered Indians, whether federal law was
applicable or not, and that system of laws was not destroyed by
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 1309.
Id. at 1310-11.
Id. at 1310.
Id.

126. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988).
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the treaty process. There was no need for the ACA to apply to
Indians.
A logical-historical consideration of the MCA and the ACA
leads to the observation that they are incompatible. The MCA
was enacted to give the federal courts jurisdiction over some
specific crimes committed by Indians in Indian Country. Its
authority is limited to those offenses named in the plain language
of the statute. The ACA, however, was adopted to expand federal
jurisdiction over non-Indians to offenses not punishable under
the federal criminal code. The purpose and intent of these two
statutes are very different and they apply to different defendants.
The MCA is not applicable to non-Indians because they are
already subject to federal law and the government need not take
affirmative action to assume jurisdiction over them. Until the
MCA, Indians in Indian Country were outside federal jurisdiction.
Thus, the scope of federal authority over Indian defendants is
limited to the boundaries as set by the MCA.
In Renville, however, the court applied both the MCA and the
ACA to circumstances involving an Indian perpetrator in Indian
Country. 27 The crime was incest. The MCA says incest is defined
by the state law which would apply if the crime were not committed by an Indian.' 28 The South Dakota rape law neither defined
nor punished incest. 29 The only way the court could have used
the South Dakota statute was through the application of the
ACA. So, the court reasoned that because the MCA provided
that "incest" should be defined by the state law, and South
Dakota's incest law did not describe what Renville did, it could
apply the ACA to find a state statute that more accurately
described Renville's actions. Once the ACA was triggered, prosecutors could roam through state statutes to find a law which
punished Renville's actions.
In addition to the problem of applying the ACA to an Indian
through the MCA, the fact that the ACA was applied based on
the assumption that Renville was guilty of incest did not automatically allow the expansion of the definition of incest to include
rape. Congress described how incest committed by an Indian was
3 0 Congress also
to be treated under federal law in the MCA.1
named rape and carnal knowledge of a female under the age of
sixteen in the MCA.13 1 Federal criminal statutes for rape and
1.27. United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985).
128. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (Supp II. 1984).

129. See S.D.

CoDmD

LAws ANN. § 22-22-1 (1979).

130. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (Supp. 11 1984).
131. Id.
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carnal knowledge of a female under eighteen were comprehensive
enough to cover Renville's crimes without this distortion of the
ACA. If the prosecution was really interested in procuring the
most severe punishment for Renville, it could have charged Renvile with appropriate federally defined crimes and achieved the
same result.
Conclusion
Renville was an Indian. There are few other differences between
him and Williams, a white man. Yet Williams went free after
having sex with an unmarried Indian girl because the Supreme
Court determined that Congress intended to prohibit the generic
offense. Renville went to prison for thirty years for committing
incest when the penalty for two counts of incest under the MCA
was only ten years. The Eighth Circuit could have put Renville
in jail for thirty years without applying the ACA and, thus,
avoided creating this precedent. If the purpose was to put Renville
behind bars for a longer term, there was an easier way. He could
have been charged with rape under the federal criminal code. He
was not-and the Eighth Circuit allowed Renville's conviction,
by way of the ACA and South Dakota rape statutes, to stand.
Precedent determines future law. Case law forms our understanding of how statutes apply. Renville is precedent which further
undermines the sovereign authority of Indian tribes. It does so
by assuming the application of the Assimilative Crimes Act to
Indians in Indian Country without any action on the part of
Congress to appropriate that expanded authority to the federal
government.
Since 1985, the Renville decision has been cited in fifty-three
cases, and followed in four.'3 2 Each of the four cases which
followed Renville cited to a portion of the decision dealing with
hearsay evidence in child abuse cases. This case is being read by
judges, attorneys and law clerks because of the hearsay ruling.
Renville has become an important case, and the first section of
the opinion contains both the facts and the problematic application of the ACA. Thus, this portion of the opinion has gone
unchallenged but not unread. The long-term damage resulting
from the application of the ACA in Renville is incalculable.
Renville distorts the clear and unambiguous language of the
MCA, the GCA, and the ACA. The frequent reading of the
132. United States v. Provost, 875 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1989); Morgan v. Forelick, 846
F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Frazier, 678 F. Supp. 499 (D.C. Penn. 1986).
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opinion by legal professionals will be instrumental in the formation of the legal community's beliefs as to the application of
these statutes to Indian defendants. Judges, attorneys, and law
clerks who read the opening section of Renville are presented
witch what appears to be a precise and accurate statement of the
law. Indian law is a specialized area of law. Attorneys who are
not knowledgeable about Indian law may erroneously assume
from Renville that the law as applied through the ACA to an
Indian defendant is the settled state of the law in this area. The
reputation of the Eighth Circuit is that of a strong court, knowledgeable about and staunchly protective of Indian rights and
tribal sovereignty. It has a special duty to provide the legal
community with carefully crafted, well-founded opinions regarding Indians. Renville is an anomaly. The court has simply misapplied the statutes.
Because the Eighth Circuit has substantial influence in the field
of Indian law, the court cannot ignore the erroneous legal concepts adopted in Renville. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit should
reconsider and revise Renville to reflect an accurate application
of the law regarding criminal prosecution of Indians in Indian
Country.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol16/iss1/8

